Revisiting the Voluntariness of Confessions after State v. Sawyer by Bigos, Michael Theodore
Maine Law Review 
Volume 54 
Number 2 UNIVERSITY OF MAINE SCHOOL OF 
LAW LECTURE SERIES 
Article 9 
June 2002 
Revisiting the Voluntariness of Confessions after State v. Sawyer 
Michael Theodore Bigos 
University of Maine School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michael T. Bigos, Revisiting the Voluntariness of Confessions after State v. Sawyer, 54 Me. L. Rev. 411 
(2002). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr/vol54/iss2/9 
This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Maine School of Law 
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maine Law Review by an authorized editor of University of 
Maine School of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact mdecrow@maine.edu. 
REVISITING THE VOLUNTARINESS OF
CONFESSIONS AFTER STATE V SAWYER
I. INTRODUCTION
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND CONCERNING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF VOLUNTARY
CONFESSIONS
A. Development of the Federal Confession Law
1. Substantive Requirements of Confession Law
2. Substantive Aspects of Presumptions in Confession Law
B. Development of the Confession Law in Maine
C. Recent Developments
III. THE SAWYER DECISION
A. Background Facts
B. Procedure, the Appeal, and Disposition
C. The Dissent
IV. DISCUSSION
V. CONCLUSION
MAINE LAW REVIEW
REVISITING THE VOLUNTARINESS OF
CONFESSIONS AFIER STATE V SAWYER
I. INTRODUCTION
Every individual in our society needs confidence in our criminal justice sys-
tem to know that one cannot be convicted of a crime unless a fact finder is con-
vinced of every necessary element with the highest assurances of the truth. 1 The
process of establishing facts in a criminal trial is highly dependent upon how deci-
sion-making power is allocated between the judge and the jury and upon the fair-
ness of that allocation. This Note discusses the areas of confession law and bur-
dens of proof in the context of how federal criminal constitutional doctrines that
affect the fact-finding process offer less than clear guidance to the states. In par-
ticular, this Note compares the separate forces of fundamental fairness and the
constitutional limits of presumptions in the law of confessions.
In State v. Sawyer,2 the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law
Court, heard the State's appeal of a trial court evidence-admissibility ruling3 that
excluded a criminal defendant's arrest and alleged confession on the ground that
the confession was involuntary and thus inadmissible.4 A divided Law Court held
that the exclusion of the confession was not warranted and remanded the case for a
second suppression hearing. 5
Sawyer presented the Law Court with an opportunity to refine the common
law of determining the voluntariness of confessions in Maine.6 The majority opin-
ion took that opportunity by ruling that the trial court should, on remand, base its
decision partly on the legal principle that criminal defendants bear a burden of
producing evidence to show that their confession was involuntary.7 Has the sub-
stantive law now been changed? And what is its impact, if any, on principles of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution?
This Note analyzes the Law Court's decision and recommends that the court
clarify the Sawyer holding by reviewing the role of presumptions in the law of
confessions during its next confession case that includes a burden of production
issue of law. The Note traces the development of the Maine law of criminal con-
fessions and critiques the Law Court's recent decision as a potential departure
from state case law doctrine that generally offers substantial protection to defen-
dants. It also examines the underlying legal principle that the court included in its
opinion: that criminal defendants who may have confessed to a crime bear a bur-
1. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
2. 2001 ME 88, 772A.2d 1173.
3. The Augusta District Court Judge heard a motion that Sawyer filed to suppress his state-
ments and arrest. State v. Sawyer, No. AUG-2000-375 (Me. Dist. Ct. 7, S. Ken., Jul. 31, 2000)
(Vafiades, J.) (Order on Motion to Suppress).
4. State v. Sawyer, 2001 ME 88, J 1, 4, 772 A.2d 1173.
5. Id. 11,772 A.2d 1173. Justice Dana wrote the opinion of the Court, and he was joined by
Chief Justice Wathen and Justices Clifford, Rudman, and Saufley. Justice Alexander wrote the
dissenting opinion and was joined by Justice Calkins.
6. See id. 7, 772 A.2d 1173.
7. See id. 11 n.5, 772 A.2d 1173 (citing cases on defendant's burden of production).
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den of producing some evidence to generate an issue of fact regarding the
voluntariness of their alleged confession.
After considering some alternative models, this Note concludes that the Law
Court should revisit this area of the law and specify the substantive law of confes-
sions in Maine with respect to constitutional limitations. In doing so, there should
remain a constitutionallypermissible alternative providing that a defendant may
rebut a prosecution's prima facie showing of voluntariness without requiring that
criminal defendants testify against themselves or provide other indirectly incrimi-
nating evidence 8 in order to avoid an unfavorable evidentiary ruling.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND CONCERNING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF VOLUNTARY
CONFESSIONS
A. Development of the Federal Confession Law
American courts have a deeply rooted rule against admitting involuntary con-
fessions into evidence. 9 The rule is recognized today as a constitutionally guaran-
teed due process safeguard10 and is derived from the English common law rule
against self-incrimination.11 Since colonial times, the right against self-incrimi-
nation has been provided to citizens by various statutes designed to prevent con-
fessions by torture. 12 This right was subsequently written into the Bill of Rights
and the constitution of almost every State. 13
The rule against admitting involuntary confessions developed only as a com-
mon law rule14 until 1936, when Brown v. Mississippi1 5 was decided. In Brown,
the Supreme Court held that an involuntary confession was inadmissible in a state
criminal case under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 16 Over
the next thirty years, the Court changed the involuntary confession rule by imple-
menting new policy objectives that increased the reliability of evidence1 7 and that
8. The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 6 of Maine's Constitution pro-
hibit a person in any criminal case from being compelled to testify against oneself.
9. See generally, Lawrence Herman, The Unexplored Relationship Between the Privilege
Against Compulsory Self-Incrimination and the Involuntary Confession Rule (Part I1), 53 OHIO
ST. L.J. 497, 498 (1992).
10. Id. at 498-99.
11. See I MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 114, at 452-53 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999).
12. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 344-45 (1968).
13. 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 11, § 114, at 453.
14. Id., § 148, at 529-3 1; see also Herman, supra note 9, at 498, n.537 (remarking "[t]hat the
involuntary confession rule was generally perceived as a common law rule" due to its treatment
in evidence treatises including I SIMON GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE, §§ 219-35 (John Henry Wigmore
rev.) (Boston, Little, Brown 16th ed. 1899)).
15. 297 U.S. 278 (1936). This landmark confessions case involved three defendants' confes-
sions that were obtained by brutal police torture and violence. Id. at 279-82. The trial court
admitted the confessions into evidence, found them guilty and had sentenced them to death. Id.
at 279.
16. Id. at 285-86.
17. See, e.g., Jackson v. Denno, 368 U.S. 378, 386-87 (1964) (holding that truthfulness of
confession is irrelevant to the voluntariness inquiry).
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were meant to generally conform police officers' conduct to a lawful, civilized,
and non-inquisitorial standard. 1 8
In 1966, the Supreme Court decided Miranda v. Arizona,19 which revolution-
ized federal constitutional confession law 20 by extending Fifth Amendment privi-
leges to suspects during custodial law enforcement interrogations. 2 1 Before
Miranda, pressure was building to broaden the self-incrimination privilege be-
cause, in an isolated police station setting, the compulsion to speak "may well be
greater than in courts or other official investigations, '22 even though law enforce-
ment had no legal authority to compel responses to their questions.2 3 To effectu-
ate the privilege in a custodial interrogation, 24 the Court designed protective de-
vices to ensure that illegally obtained confessions would be excluded from evi-
dence as a matter of Fifth Amendment law. The most notable of these devices are
voluntariness standards, 25 the right to counsel,26 and the explicit, pre-interroga-
tion Miranda warning. 27 In Lego v. Twomey, 28 however, the Supreme Court held
that, while elements of a crime need to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt,
voluntariness in confession law need be proven only under a preponderance stan-
dard. 29 States were free, however, to adopt a higher standard of proof, even though
the Court determined that a higher standard was not constitutionally necessary. 30
A new dimension was added to American confession law twenty years later, in
Colorado v. Connelly.3 1 The result of Connelly is that spontaneous statements
made while not under interrogation are inadmissible only when accompanied by
"coercive police activity." 32 Before Connelly, confessions were generally subject
to an analysis that discouraged, but did not require, coercive police activity.33 For
example, Maine considered internally coercive factors, such as one's mental state,
as well as external law enforcement coercion in determining whether a statement
18. See Lawrence Herman, The Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and the Good Old
Days of Police Interrogation, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 749-50 (1987) (collecting cases). See Colo-
rado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163-64 (1986) (suggesting that police conduct should not shock
the Court's conscience with physically and psychologically coercive tactics); Rogers v. Rich-
mond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961) (asserting that an accusatorial system instead of inquisito-
rial techniques should be used by police); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959)
(stating that police must obey the law).
19. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
20. 1 McCoRMICK, supra note 11, § 149, at 533.
21. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 460-61.
22. Id. at 461.
23. 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 11, § 149, at 533.
24. For Miranda protections to apply, a suspect must be in "custody" and "interrogated." id.
§ 150, at 537 (explaining constitutional standards for establishing each of the elements of custo-
dial interrogation).
25. See generally, id. § 152, at 541-43; see also, David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophy-
lactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 193-94 (1988).
26. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 470.
27. id. at 473.
28. 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
29. Id. at 489.
30. Id.
31. 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
32. Id. at 160, 167.
33. E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436.
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should be suppressed as involuntary. 34 However, the Connelly Court was pre-
sented with a new question: should confessions require police overreaching to be
inadmissible? 35
In Connelly, the petitioner, a schizophrenic, approached a police officer and
admitted to committing a murder.36 This led to the quick involvement of a detec-
tive who prompted Connelly to offer "what he had on his mind."'37 This caused
Connelly to convey many details of an unsolved murder and eventually led police
to the exact location of the killing.38 The Court reversed the trial court's suppres-
sion of Connelly's confession, which the trial court had ruled was involuntary due
to his psychosis despite the absence of coercive police activity.39 The Court estab-
lished a new requirement, holding that there must be coercive police activity to
find a confession involuntary,40 and suggested that the coercive conduct at issue
must be causally related to the confession itself to render a confession unconstitu-
tionally inadmissible. 4 1
1. Substantive Requirements of Confession Law
A discussion of how the Connelly case changed the substantive law of confes-
sions for the states is important. Prior to Connelly, the question of accuracy of a
particular confession was carefully distinguished from the constitutional question
of voluntariness. 4 2 Due process concerns had prohibited the use of "a legal stan-
dard which took into account the circumstance of probable truth or falsity" in a
trial court's determination of admissibility of a confession that was challenged on
the issue of voluntariness. 4 3 Thus, evidence that would suggest the inaccuracy or
accuracy of a confession or a part thereof should have been immaterial to the
voluntariness inquiry.44 A leading treatise on the subject contends that the prohi-
bition of a case-by-case consideration of accuracy is consistent with principles
that suggest the unreliability of involuntary confessions -"they tend to be so sub-
tly unreliable [due to the coercive nature] that juries and judges are likely to give
them more weight than can objectively be justified."'45
34. See, e.g., State v. Mikulewicz, 462 A.2d 497, 501 (Me. 1983) (considering internal fac-
tors of intoxication and nakedness for determining that confession was involuntary). Appar-
ently, this facet of Maine confession law is still on the books in light of Connelly. See Donald W.
Macomber, A Call for Consistency: State v. Caouette is No Longer Viable In Light of Colorado
v. Connelly and State v. Eastman, 50 ME. L. REV. 61, 64 (1998). In his article, Macomber
advanced the proposition that Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986), implicitly rejected the
Maine approach-which technically does not require police overreaching-to involuntary con-
fessions. Id. He also observed that even though the Law Court states that it follows the same
rationale as the U.S. Supreme Court, it does not in fact do so. Id. at 62.
35. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 163-67.
36. Id. at 160.
37. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
38. Id. at 160-61.
39. Id. at 157, 162.
40. Id. at 167.
41. Id. at 164.
42. 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 147, at 567-68 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992). The
Fourth Edition of McCormick on Evidence was chosen here and in several footnotes below for
its extensive post-Connelly analysis of how the confession law changed. Much of this analysis
appears to have been edited from the Fifth Edition of McCormick.
43. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1961).
44. 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 42, § 147 at 568.
45. Id.
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Connelly, however, broadened this facet of the law to further remove concerns
of accuracy from the voluntariness inquiry. The Court held that the Due Process
Clause should not be a device to exclude presumptively false evidence, but is pri-
marily aimed at preventing "fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence, whether
true or false." 46 Further, under Connelly, matters of unreliability should be gov-
erned not by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but by the
laws of evidence of that jurisdiction.4 7 The Connelly decision also made the pres-
ence of offensive law enforcement conduct an absolute prerequisite, which was a
significant change from the previous case law that merely emphasized the need to
discourage coercive police activity used to elicit confessions. 48 Once the "prereq-
uisite" of coercion is found, however, the suspect's decision-making process is
relevant to the inquiry. If police coercion is established, a court must determine
whether the defendant's will was overborne.49 At this point, the susceptibility to
coercion, exacerbated by the defendant's mental condition, becomes relevant.50
As such, evidence of psychological persuasion used to obtain a confession, even if
subtle, has the effect of making the defendant's mental condition more significant
in resolving the voluntariness inquiry.5 1
Connelly also signaled a change in the timing of consideration of the numer-
ous factors that a court would evaluate in a voluntariness challenge. After the
Connelly decision, courts were required to determine whether there was police
coercion before inquiring into a defendant's actual subjective circumstances and
reactions thereto. 52 This change marked a subtle departure from a traditional,
multi-factored voluntariness test that gave significant weight to the following fac-
tors: the time of day or night; duration of the interrogation; the conditions sur-
rounding the defendant while being held; the age of the accused (the younger, the
more likely the confession was to be involuntary); degree, if any, of physical infir-
mity or injury; level of education; degree of experience with police methods and
tactics (little or no experience suggested involuntariness); whether the suspect was
warned of his or her right to silence; whether the right to keep silent was explained,
even though not necessary; and whether the suspect appreciated the gravity of that
right. 53 The above factors were essentially an early "totality of the circumstances"
test that courts used to determine the ultimate question of voluntariness. 54 The
modern test, which has several substantive changes, is discussed below.
46. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167 (citing Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236
(1941)) (internal quotations omitted).
47. Id.
48. 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 42, § 147, at 568-69.
49. Id. § 147, at 569-70.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 569, n.28 (discussing case law requirements and quoting Connelly for the proposi-
tion that "'mental condition is surely relevant to an individual's susceptibility to police coer-
cion"' (quoting Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164-65)).
52. Id. § 147, at 571.
53. Id. § 147, at 570 (citing several cases for individual factors to be considered: Greenwald
v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519, 519-21 (1968) (time of day, physical illness, education level, hold-
ing conditions, and lack of knowledge of constitutional rights); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49,
52-53 (1949) (duration); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49,54 (1962) (age); Mincey v. Arizona,
437 U.S. 385, 398-99 (1978) (physical injury); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963)
(ignorance of criminal law)).
54. See id. at 571.
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One important trend in the post-Connelly era, however, has been the reluc-
tance of lower courts to fully embrace the need to find police coercive activity
before inquiring into the subjective beliefs of a criminal defendant. 55 This may be
caused by the "view that the concept of official coercion is so vaguely defined that
it can generally be found on most facts by courts predisposed to find it."'56 On the
other hand, as the McCormick treatise postulates, the requirement of official coer-
cion is an insignificant barrier to a voluntariness analysis. 57 Yet, as we will see in
the Sawyer decision below, the requirement is but one source of confusion when
the separate tests for finding coercion and involuntariness overlap and are used to
justify the appellate court's de novo review of the case. 58 At any rate, the ultimate
resolution of a voluntariness claim requires an analysis of policy considerations as
to whether the means used to elicit the confession at issue "'are compatible with a
system that presumes innocence and assures that a conviction will not be secured
by inquisitorial means.'
59
Logically implicit in a finding of voluntariness is that a defendant waived the
right against self-incrimination and the right to counsel, that the defendant had
knowledge or intelligence of what those rights were, and that those rights applied
to the defendant when making an incriminatory statement or confession. 60 How-
ever, such intelligence is merely a factor to consider, and is not an absolute re-
quirement. 6 1 The Supreme Court has commented that the prosecution is never
required to prove, in its initial burden, that a defendant was aware of his or her
right to refuse to answer a police officer's questions.6 2 This means that there is no
general sub-requirement of "intelligence" of persons waiving their substantive rights
for the prosecution to meet its initial burden of production for a finding of due
process voluntariness. 63 However, there is an intelligence requirement, discussed
below, for custodial interrogation64 settings.
Much confusion lingers in the wake of Miranda and Connelly as to how law
enforcement officers must conduct themselves to comply with admissibility stan-
dards and exactly how lower courts shall administer the voluntariness rule.65 In
fact, the Supreme Court acknowledges that many impermissible interrogation prac-
55. Id. at 571. See also State v. Rees, 2000 ME 55, 7-9, 748 A.2d 976.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. In Sawyer, the trial court seems to have merged the coercive police activity test with the
custody (for Miranda purposes) test when analyzing a police cruiser's physical position. See
infra notes 136, 146. The merger of these tests would be an example of lower courts' "reluc-
tance to give up their traditional prerogative[s]." 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 42, § 147 at 571.
59. 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 42, § 147 at 572 n.49 (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104,
116 (1985)).
60. Id. at 571.
61. Id. ("[T]he defendant's awareness of his right is relevant, [but] there is no absolute re-
quirement that he be shown to have been cognizant of his legal right to decline a self-incriminat-
ing admission.").
62. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226-27 (1973).
63. 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 42, § 147 at 571.
64. Despite the numerous contextual references and functional definition tests in confession
law, a "custodial interrogation" can be defined as: "Intense police questioning of a detained
person." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY, 825 (7th ed. 1999). "Interrogation" is defined as: "The
formal or systematic questioning of a person; [especially] intensive questioning by the police,
[usually] of a person arrested for or suspected of committing a crime." Id.
65. See generally, 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 42, § 147 at 573.
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tices have not been deterred, at least partially because of the lack of guidance from
the courts: "Problems raised by subtle interrogation techniques had not been ad-
dressed, practical guidelines for interrogating officers had not been developed,
and recurring instances of what the Court regarded as clearly impermissible inter-
rogation practices demonstrated that the costs being paid for the voluntariness rule
were not deterring prohibited interrogation practices."'66
Finally, the burden imposed upon prosecutors with regard to custodial interro-
gation requires that they at least make a showing of an effective (i.e., voluntary)
waiver of the suspect's right to remain silent.67 What this means is less than clear.6 8
A confession obtained during an interrogation would seem to necessitate a higher
standard to find that a person waived his or her rights than in a non-custodial
setting, because the suspect's interests are at a greater risk when in custody.69
However, the burden does not require a higher standard when the confession takes
place during a custodial interrogation.70 In order to make a prima facie showing,
the prosecution must generally show that the suspect appeared to decide freely to
provide an incriminating statement and was not threatened or promised anything
in exchange for the statement.7 1 If defense counsel introduces evidence that sug-
gests coercive law enforcement activity was present and that the coercion causally
relates to the elicited confession, the prosecution may have to respond to this re-
buttal with additional evidence to meet its burden of persuasion. 72 In addition, the
prosecution's burden is higher if the suspect was re-approached subsequent to in-
voking his or her right to remain silent.73
2. Substantive Aspects of Presumptions in Confession Law
The Sawyer case involved an interesting juncture between confession law,
rebuttable presumptions, and the privilege against self-incrimination. 74 As such, a
brief discussion of the law of presumptions is necessary.
Establishing presumptions in confession law is inherent in jurisprudence and
helps make constitutional rights "more meaningful."'75 Cases that discuss pre-
sumptions can illuminate the nature of the authority of how a trial should be con-
ducted. As one scholar describes, "cases and commentary about constitutional
limits on presumptions are best understood as expressions of, and factors in, the
creation of the changing concept of what due process is all about."'76
66. Id. at 573-74.
67. See id. § 151 at 593. Waiver of the right to counsel is also necessary. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 594.
70. See id. (quoting Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 169-70 (1986)).
71. Id. at 597.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 595. Although not relevant to this Note or the Sawyer case, Michigan v. Mosley,
423 U.S. 96 (1975), outlines a multifactor-test for determining whether a defendant has waived
the right to silence after invoking that right. I MCCORMICK, supra note 42, at 595-96.
74. See State v. Sawyer, 2001 ME 88, 112, 772 A.2d 1173 (Alexander, J., dissenting) (men-
tioning the Fifth Amendment, burdens of proof, and voluntariness requirements).
75. Yale Kamisar, Confessions, Search and Seizure and the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J.
465, 472 (1999).
76. Leslie J. Harris, Constitutional Limits on Criminal Presumptions as an Expression of
Changing Concepts of Fundamental Fairness, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 308, 309 (1986).
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Presumptions of fact have traditionally been developed by courts and legisla-
tures in an effort to reshape the substantive law and to functionally define the
distribution of power between judge and jury.77 As a result of several Supreme
Court cases, 7 8 however, constitutional limitations upon the due process require-
ments have developed, the most important of which is that legislatures may not
adopt statutory presumptions to satisfy and reallocate the burden of persuasion of
an element of a crime to a criminal defendant. 79 Factors that determine criminal
liability, however, are constitutionally permissible to develop and the factors may
include which party shall bear the burdens for each factor.80 In 1975, the United
States Supreme Court decided Mullaney v. Wilbur,8 1 holding that a rebuttable pre-
sumption that shifts the burden of persuasion of any element of a crime82 from the
prosecution to the defendant is unconstitutional. 83 The Mullaney holding appears
not to extend so far as to require the prosecution to bear the burden of persuasion
on every fact that is relevant to an assessment of culpability-a significant change
which would have required substantial revision of burden-of-persuasion alloca-
tion for affirmative defenses in many jurisdictions.84
Presumptions that allow proof of one fact (a "proved" fact, such as presence
of a firearm in an automobile) to be sufficient to prove another (a "presumed" fact,
such as possession of the firearm by the automobile occupants 85) in order to sat-
isfy a burden of production are also permissible, but subject to constitutional limi-
tations. 86 In 1979, the Supreme Court decided Ulster County Court v. Allen, 87
which sounded a significant change in the substantive law of rebuttable criminal
presumptions. In Ulster County Court, four defendants were charged with and
convicted of unlawful possession of firearms in an automobile in which they were
riding. 88 A New York statute provided that "the presence of a firearm in an auto-
mobile is presumptive evidence of its illegal possession by all persons then occu-
pying the vehicle."'89
Upholding the New York statute, the Court reaffirmed the requirement of a
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975);
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977); Ulster County Ct. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979);
Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
79. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684,702-03 nn.30-31 (1975); Harris, supra note 76, at 309.
80. Harris, supra note 76, at 309.
81. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
82. Of course, the prosecution's burden of persuasion for all elements of a crime must be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See generally In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
83. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. at 702.
84. Harris, supra note 76, at 331-32 (citing John Calvin Jeffries, Jr. & Paul B. Stephan III,
Defenses, Presumptions and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325, 1338-44
(1979)). See also, John C. Sheldon, Presumptions Against Criminal. Defendants, Affirmative
Defenses, and a Substantive Due Process Interpretation of County Court of Ulster v. Allen, 34
ME. L. REV. 277, 278 (1982) (arguing that the rebuttable burden-of-persuasion-shifting-presump-
tion is analogous to an affirmative defense).
85. See infra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
86. Harris, supra note 76, at 335.
87. 442 U.S. 140 (1979).
88. Ulster County Ct. v. Allen, 442 U.S. at 143-44.
89. Id. at 142 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.15(3) (McKinney 1967)).
"rational connection" between proven and presumed facts 90 and divided presump-
tions into the two categories of "permissive" and "mandatory." 9 1 The Court stated
about the general context of the law:
Inferences and presumptions are a staple of our adversary system of
factfinding. It is often necessary for the trier of fact to determine the existence of
an element of the crime-that is, an "ultimate" or "elemental" fact-from the
existence of one or more "evidentiary" or "basic" facts.... The value of these
evidentiary devices, and their validity under the Due Process Clause, vary from
case to case, however, depending on the strength of the connection between the
particular basic and elemental facts involved and on the degree to which the de-
vice curtails the factfinder's freedom to assess the evidence independently ....
[Tihe ultimate test of any [presumption] device's constitutional validity ... re-
mains constant: the device must not undermine the factfinder's responsibility at
trial, based on evidence adduced by the State, to find the ultimate facts beyond a
reasonable doubt [under In re Winship].92
The Court then held that as long as presumptions are not the sole and sufficient
basis for a finding of guilt, a presumed fact is admissible if rationally connected
and "more likely than not to flow from" the proved fact.
9 3
The relevance of Ulster County Court here is that burden allocation rules have
constitutional guidelines that, if met, allow a jurisdiction to shape the expectations
of how criminal defendants are treated in the criminal justice system. 94 States are
free to establish presumptions based on their view of "fairness," as long as the
proof beyond a reasonable doubt requirement for elements of a crime is met, such
that it provides assurances that persons convicted of crimes are in fact guilty.95
90. Id. at 165 (The Court reaffirmed the "Leary test," stating that there must be a "'rational
connection' between the basic facts that the prosecution proved and the ultimate fact presumed,
and [that] the latter is 'more likely than not to flow from' the former." (quoting Leary v. United
States, 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969))).
91. Id. at 157.
92. Id. at 156 (citations omitted).
93. Id. at 165, 167.
94. See Harris, supra note 76, at 355.
95. Id. at 356. There is a vast array of state law doctrines on presumptions of voluntary
confessions, each having their own rationales of efficiency, truth finding, and fairness. Today, at
least the following states explicitly require that a defendant rebut the presumption of voluntariness
after a prima facie showing by the prosecution: Chambers v. State, 742 So. 2d 466, 468 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1999) ("[Olnce the State has made a prima facie showing of the voluntariness of
a confession, the burden of proof then shifts to the defendant to show that the confession was not
voluntary."); People v. Patterson, 610 N.E.2d 16, 30 (111. 1992) ("The burden is upon the State to
establish that the confession was voluntary, and upon the establishment of a prima facie case,
the burden of going forward with proof properly shifts to the accused."); Johnson v. State, 235
N.E.2d 688, 693 (Ind. 1968) ("[A] confession is prima facie admissible and the burden showing
its incompetency is on the accused .... ); Spann v. State, 771 So.2d 883, 900 (Miss. 2000)
("After the State has made out its prima facie case [that the defendant's confession was voluntar-
ily made], the defendant must rebut the State's evidence by offering testimony that violence,
threats of violence, or offers of reward induced the confession."); State v. Day, 970 S.W.2d 406,
409 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) ("After the state has made a prima facie case [that the defendant's
incriminating statement was voluntary], the defendant must produce evidence showing any 'spe-
cial circumstance' that may have rendered the confession involuntary." (quoting State v. Simpson,
606 S.W.2d 514, 516-17 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980)).
The following states explicitly treat confessions as prima facie involuntary: Exparte Price,
725 So.2d 1063, 1067 (Ala. 1998) (a confession or extrajudicial inculpatory statement is prima
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B. Development of the Confession Law in Maine
In Maine, the voluntary confession case law generally followed the federal
common law,96 with at least two notable distinctions relevant to this discussion. 97
First, with regard to burdens of proof, Maine case law traditionally presumed that
confessions were voluntary and required that the defendant rebut such a presump-
tion before a jury.98 However, until Sawyer, this common law rule appeared to
have faded away in light of several U.S. Supreme Court decisions. 99 Evidence of
this appears through the abrogation of the rule allowing juries to determine the
legal admissibility of confessions. 10 0 Since 1972, the Law Court has not referred
to the antiquated presumption of voluntariness that was designed to be used in the
company of a jury. Second, Maine surpassed the constitutional requirement of
establishing voluntariness by a preponderance of evidence outlined in Lego v.
Twomey, 101 by adopting a "beyond a reasonable doubt" requirement in the land-
facie involuntary, and the prosecution must show voluntariness and that proper Miranda warn-
ings were given to have it admitted); State v. Trostle, 951 P.2d 869, 879 (Ariz. 1997) ("Because
confessions are prima facie involuntary, the state has the burden of showing voluntariness by a
preponderance of the evidence."); Dorsciak v. Gladden, 425 P.2d 177, 180 (Or. 1967) ("'[A]
confession of guilt is prima facie involuntary, and... a burden is placed upon the state to show
that it was voluntarily made without the inducement of either fear or hope."' (quoting State v.
Schwenson, 392 P.2d 328, 336 (Or. 1964))).
96. Macomber, supra note 34, at 68-69. This Article also provides a detailed comparative
analysis of the early Maine confession cases and their federal counterparts. Id. at 66-72. For a
pre-Connelly overview of federal confession cases, see John C. Sheldon, The Obsolescence of
Voluntary Confessions in Maine, 35 ME. L. REV. 243, 249-56 (1983). Sheldon's article postu-
lates, inter alia, that almost all confessions in Maine are unjustifiably inadmissible after the
Caouette decision (discussed infra note 155, and accompanying text). Id. at 257.
97. For other distinctions between federal and Maine cases that are beyond the scope of this
Note, see John C. Sheldon, Sobriety Checkpoints, the Rational-Basis Test, and the Law Court, 8
ME. B.J. 80 (1993). Additionally, for more background and a dialogue of whether Fifth Amend-
ment protections should be extended to field sobriety tests as they are to inculpatory evidence in
Maine, see Michael J. Waxman, Fifth Amendment, Shmifth Amendment: For Real Protection
Against Compelled Self-Incrimination in OUI Prosecutions, Look to the Maine Constitution, 11
ME. B.J. 148 (1996); Donald W. Macomber, The Maine Constitution's Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination Revisited-A Response to Mr. Waxman, 11 ME. B.J. 380 (1996); Michael J. Waxman,
Mr. Waxman Responds, 12 ME. B.J. 22 (1997).
98. State v. Merrow, 161 Me. 111, 116-17, 208 A.2d 659, 662 (1965); State v. Robbins, 135
Me. 121, 123, 190 A. 630, 632 (1937); State v. Grover, 96 Me. 363, 368, 52 A. 757, 759 (1902).
99. E.g., Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966).
100. State v. Collins, 297 A.2d 620, 636 (Me. 1972). In Collins, the court stated that, inter
alia, Grover, Robbins, and Merrow were, "held to be without continuing force, as precedent, to
indicate the law of this State," regarding the jury's role in evidentiary admissibility of confes-
sions. Id. The court did not specifically comment on the status of the rebuttable presumption
confession law and apparently it has not done so until the Sawyer case.
101. 404 U.S. 477 (1972). In this case, the Court held that states must establish voluntariness
by a preponderance of the evidence at a minimum. Id. at 489. Well before Lego, the govern-
ment was always expected to "shoulder the entire load" of proving voluntariness. 8 JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2251, at 317 (John T. McNaughton rev. ed.
1961); but see Joseph D. Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L.
REV. 859, 934 (1979) (asserting that the accused is often asked to share "the load").
In Lego, the Court reasoned that due process requirements are based upon concern that jurors
would improperly view coerced confessions that were reliable and truthful as probative. Lego v.
Twomey, 404 U.S. at 485. The fact that juries might not recognize the inaccuracy of an involun-
tary confession was not the primary rationale behind their holding. Id. at 484-85. As a result,
the possibility that juries' reliance on inaccurate confessions might produce wrongful convic-
tions does not suggest that a high burden must exist to establish admissibility. Id.
mark State v. Collins 102 decision. Several other states have taken advantage of the
option to impose higher standards to prove voluntariness in their constitutions 10 3
and sometimes in conjunction with other requirements, 104 and each with varying
degrees of proof. 105
Many of the other aspects of Maine's contemporary confession law are sub-
stantively similar to the federal constitutional guidelines. First, police officers
typically need a "reasonable and articulable suspicion" to justify stopping a person
who is thought to have committed a crime. 106 Unless this is done, the investiga-
tory stop may constitute a search that is violative of the Fourth Amendment. 10 7
Next, if an officer's actions became an interrogation and custodial in nature, a
suspect's statements are inadmissible if a proper Miranda warning was warranted,
but not given. 10 8 Determining whether a defendant was in custody is often diffi-
cult, especially if an officer's initial contact resembles normal procedure for ask-
ing a bystander for voluntary information to assess the general situation or other
contact that is employed to preserve the officer's personal safety.109 Volunteered
statements are not within the Miranda rule and statements obtained as part of a
general investigation must be distinguished from those secured in a custodial in-
terrogation. 110 A court will establish that a defendant was "in custody" if sub-
jected to a formal arrest or "a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree
associated with a formal arrest."'' 1
The 1998 Michaud decision stated the factors to be considered in a "totality of
the circumstances test" for a determination of custody and voluntariness 112 as fol-
lows:
102. 297 A.2d at 627.
103. E.g., State v. Monroe, 711 A.2d 878,883 (N.H. 1998) (noting that proof of voluntariness
beyond a reasonable doubt is required by the New Hampshire Constitution (citing State v. Beland,
645 A.2d 79, 80 (1994))).
104. E.g., State v. Hopkins, 799 So. 2d 1234, 1236 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (stating that the state
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a confession is admissible when the defense moves
to suppress a confession).
105. E.g., State v. Brouillard, 745 A.2d 759, 762 (R.I. 2000) (saying the state must show
effective waivers of right to silence by clear and convincing evidence).
106. State v. Lear, 1998 ME 273, 5, 722 A.2d 1266. To justify making an investigatory
stop, an officer must have a subjective, articulable suspicion of criminal activity and that suspi-
cion must be objectively reasonable "in the totality of the circumstances." Id.
107. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985) (describing the Fourth Amendment
requirements of a lawful investigative "Terry stop" and quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20
(1968)).
108. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,477 (1966); State v. Michaud, 1998 ME 251, 3,724
A.2d 1222.
109. See State v. Philbrick, 436 A.2d 844, 849 (Me. 1981). In Philbrick, a police officer, who
knew nothing about whether the defendant had committed a possible crime, conducted an in-
quiry that was found to be lawful because it was merely a general, initial on-the-scene request
for information that police officers have a duty to perform in their usual investigation of crimi-
nal incidents. Id.
110. Id.
111. State v. Holloway, 2000 ME 172, 14, 760 A.2d 223 (quoting Thompson v. Keohane,
516 U.S. 99, 112-13 (1995)); see also State v. Michaud, 1998 ME 251, 4, 724 A.2d 1222
(quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994)).
112. The contemporary voluntariness requirement for admissibility, after considering the
"totality of the circumstances," is that a defendant's statement must be the result "'of his own
free will and rational intellect."' State v. Rees, 2000 ME 55, 3, 748 A.2d 976 (quoting the
suppression judge's order granting the motion to suppress).
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To determine whether a defendant was restrained to the degree associated
with a formal arrest, a court must ascertain "whether a reasonable person in the
defendant's position would have believed he was in police custody and constrained
to a degree associated with formal arrest." In making this "reasonable person"
analysis of whether a defendant is "in custody," a court may examine a number of
objective factors, including:
(1) the locale where the defendant made the statements;
(2) the party who initiated the contact;
(3) the existence or non-existence of probable cause to arrest (to the
extent communicated to the defendant);
(4) subjective views, beliefs, or intent that the police manifested to the
defendant, to the extent they would affect how a reasonable person in
the defendant's position would perceive his or her freedom to leave;
(5) subjective views or beliefs that the defendant manifested to the po-
lice, to the extent the officer's response would affect how a reasonable
person in the defendant's position would perceive his or her freedom to
leave;
(6) the focus of the investigation (as a reasonable person in the
defendant's position would perceive it);
(7) whether the suspect was questioned in familiar surroundings;
(8) the number of law enforcement officers present;
(9) the degree of physical restraint placed upon the suspdct; and
(10) the duration and character of the interrogation. 113
Finally, the Law Court has established standards of review for determining
whether a trial court made an error with regard to factual findings or the applica-
tion of the law. Factual findings are reviewed deferentially for "clear error" and
the application of law is subject to stricter "independent appellate review." 114 In
other words, the Law Court looks at the big picture and will not disturb a trial
court's conclusion that a statement was involuntary if it is rationally supported by
the evidence. 115
The standard of review that appellate courts apply to confession decisions
varies significantly. 116 Commonly, intermediate courts apply traditional defer-
ence to trial judges and only overturn them if the decisions are an abuse of discre-
tion or are clearly erroneous. 117 However, many appellate courts distinguish and
reserve "ultimate" questions for de novo review; whether a challenged confession
was voluntary is a frequent example of this sort of "ultimate" question. 118 This
113. State v. Michaud, 1998 ME 251, 1 4,724 A.2d 1222 (citing Stansbury v. California, 511
U.S. at 322; State v. Gardiner, 509 A.2d 1160, 1163 n.3 (Me. 1986); and State v. Thibodeau, 496
A.2d 635, 639 (Me. 1985)).
114. State v. Coombs, 1998 ME 1, 7, 8, 704 A.2d 387.
115. State v. Caouette, 446A.2d 1120, 1124 (Me. 1982).
116. 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 42, § 162 at 663.
117. Id.
118. Id. "[F]actual findings regarding circumstances will be overturned only if clearly erro-
neous, but 'legal sufficiency of those findings show [that] voluntariness is... a question of law
which we review de novo."' Id. n.43 (quoting United States v. Bartlett, 856 F2d 1071, 1084-85
(8th Cir., 1988)).
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practice is not contradicted by any federal requirements. Determinations of cred-
ibility (that only a trial court can make) are not fundamental to resolving an issue
of voluntariness. 119
C. Recent Developments
The right to silence today is arguably in a state of flux and not immune from
proponents of a system that would make more confessions admissible in order to
obtain more convictions. 120 In Dickerson v. United States,12 1 the United States
Supreme Court recently reaffirmed a beacon of the Miranda doctrine: that an irre-
buttable presumption of involuntariness arises upon any violation of Miranda warn-
ing requirements. 122 At issue in Dickerson was the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501, a 1968 congressional repeal of the Miranda exclusionary rule. 123 Shortly
after the Miranda case, Congress sought to reverse its holding by way of § 3501 to
specifically return to a voluntariness inquiry in lieu of Miranda's irrebuttable pre-
sumption principle. 124 Apparently, this provision had never been vigorously en-
forced and, until the Clinton Administration, had remained constitutionally un-
challenged. 125
119. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 116 (1985) (stating that the issue of voluntariness
"has always had a uniquely legal dimension" and that "techniques for extracting the statements
... [must be] compatible with a system that presumes innocence and assures that a conviction
will not be secured by inquisitorial means").
120. See Daniel J. Seidmann & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A Game-
Theoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114 HARV. L. REV. 430, 432 (2000) (ex-
plaining unsuccessful congressional attempts to erode the constitutional right to silence and
citing analogous academic commentary).
121. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
122. Id. at 432.
123. Id. The Court quoted at length from § 3501, stating:
"(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the District
of Columbia, a confession ... shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily
given. Before such confession is received in evidence, the trial judge shall, out of the
presence of the jury, determine any issue as to voluntariness. If the trial judge deter-
mines that the confession was voluntarily made it shall be admitted in evidence and
the trial judge shall permit the jury to hear relevant evidence on the issue of
voluntariness and shall instruct the jury to give such weight to the confession as the
jury feels it deserves under all the circumstances.
"(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into con-
sideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession including
(1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the
confession, if it was made after arrest and before arraignment, (2) whether such de-
fendant knew the nature of the offense with which he was charged or of which he was
suspected at the time of making the confession, (3) whether or not such defendant was
advised or knew that he was not required to make any statement and that any such
statement could be used against him, (4) whether or not such defendant had been
advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel; and (5) whether
or not such defendant was without the assistance of counsel when questioned and
when giving such confession.
"The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to be taken into
consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the
confession."
Id. at 435-36 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3501).
124. United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667,668 (4th Cir. 1999).
125. James R. O'Neill, Note, United States v. Dickerson: The Beginning of the End for
Miranda?, 51 MERCER L. REV. 1359, 1364-65 (2000).
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To support the affirmation of the Miranda principle, in a 7-2 decision, Chief
Justice Rehnquist stated that "stare decisis weigh[ed] heavily against overruling
[the exclusionary rule] now."126 The Court neglected to examine Miranda on its
merits, which may infer its susceptibility and that of other right-to-silence doc-
trines to future erosion. 127
Arguing on the side of preserving the right to silence under the merits of
Miranda, perhaps for the next Supreme Court challenge to follow Dickerson, are
Professors Daniel Seidmann 12 8 and Alex Stein, 129 who assert that "by making
silence advantageous to guilty suspects, the right to silence helps the innocent as
well as the guilty: without this right, the guilty would lack an inducement to sepa-
rate themselves from the innocent."' 130 The research of these scholars indicates
that the absence of the right to silence would result in a "pooling of all suspects,"
thus impeaching the exculpatory evidence of innocent suspects and defendants
with the addition of guilty suspects' own exculpatory stories. 13 1 Further, they
argue that guilty suspects prefer silence over lies because silence is not refutable,
unlike lies-and that this has the effect of producing true stories from innocent
suspects, which, when combined with the requirement to prove all elements be-
yond a reasonable doubt, helps expose who the innocent defendants really are.132
Ell. THE SAWYER DECISION
A. Background Facts
On December 4, 1999 around 1:00 A.M., a municipal police officer observed a
truck passing another vehicle at seventy-three miles per hour in a fifty miles per
hour zone, forcing the officer's car into a breakdown lane to avoid collision. 133
The officer then turned on the cruiser's blue lights and reversed direction to follow
the vehicles, temporarily losing sight of them in the process. 134 After reversing
direction once again, the officer found both of the vehicles in a residential drive-
way in an apparent attempt to elude the police officer.135 The officer then parked
the police cruiser behind the vehicles, although the facts are unclear as to whether
there was actually enough room for one or both of the vehicles to get past the
126. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. at 443.
127. Seidmann & Stein, supra note 120, at 432. Seidmann and Stein address the argument
that relevant rules should be amended to encourage more criminal suspects' voluntary state-
ments during police interrogations and more defendants' testimony in court, rather than remain-
ing silent. Id. at 433. They suggest, however, that because guilty suspects currently choose to
remain silent instead of lying for fear that lies will be used against them to infer guilt, removing
the right to silence would enhance the incentive to lie. Id.
128. Professor of Economics, Economics Department, University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne.
Id. at 431.
129. Sylvan M. Cohen Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University of Jerusa-
lem. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 439.
132. Id. at 449, n.62 (citing Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evi-
dence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1505 (1999)).
133. State v. Sawyer, 2001 ME 88 2, 772 A.2d 1173.
134. See id.
135. See id.
parked cruiser to re-enter the roadway. 13 6 This fact later became significant to the
question of whether the defendant was "in custody."
The officer encountered four males and stated that he was conducting an in-
vestigatory stop based on a civil violation; he inquired as to which person was
driving the truck at the time of the high-speed passing. 137 One of the males, Wil-
liam Sawyer, was asked to move away from the truck and was then asked if he was
the driver, to which Sawyer answered affirmatively. 138 Next, the officer conducted
a field sobriety test upon Sawyer, during which Sawyer told the officer that he had
been drinking too much. 139 At that time, the officer placed him in handcuffs, and
positioned him into the cruiser. 140 No Miranda warnings were administered be-
fore Sawyer was questioned. 14 1
B. Procedure, the Appeal, and Disposition
The State of Maine charged Sawyer with criminal Operation Under the Influ-
ence ("OUI"), to which Sawyer pleaded not guilty.14 2 Sawyer subsequently filed
motions to suppress the arrest and statements that he made to the arresting officer
on the basis that they were an unconstitutional interrogation and arrest. 143 The
trial court held a hearing at which only the officer testified; subsequently the court
granted the motion to suppress Sawyer's arrest and his admission to operating the
truck. 144 Sawyer's motion to suppress the statement of his drinking too much was
denied, and thus was admissible in evidence. 145
On appeal, two of the trial court's legal conclusions were the focus of review:
(1) that Sawyer was not in custody while being asked questions by the officer and
as he was standing next to his vehicle (which was at least partially blocked by the
police cruiser)146 ; and (2) that Sawyer's admission to operating the truck was in-
voluntary. 147
136. See id. 11,772 A.2d 1173. The Court described the positions of two vehicles relative
to the police cruiser. Id. The significance of this was a factor for determining whether the
defendant was not free to leave and thus in custody for Miranda purposes. Id.
137. Id. 2, 772A.2d 1173.
138. Id. 3,772A.2d 1173.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. 4, 772 A.2d 1173.
144. Id.
145. See id.
146. State v. Sawyer, No. Aug-2000-375 (Me. Dist. Ct. 7, S. Ken., Jul. 31, 2000) (Vafiades,
1) (order on motion to suppress). The suppression order stated the following:
[The] officer's conduct was not of such a coercive nature nor the physical setting so
unfriendly that the defendant would have believed he was in police custody or con-
strained to the degree associated with formal arrest. The court finds that the defen-
dant was not in custody and Mirand warnings were not required.
Id.
147. State v. Sawyer, 2001 ME 88, 6,772 A.2d 1173. The District Court found that Sawyer's
admission was not voluntary because, "a reasonable person would believe that he had no choice
but to answer the officer's questions." Id.
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The State urged the Law Court to reverse the trial court's suppression order
14 8
on the grounds that the factual findings were "questionable," 14 9 and that two le-
gally inconsistent conclusions were reached based upon the evidence presented at
the suppression hearing: that Sawyer was not in custody, but gave an involuntary
confession. 150 Typically, a conclusion of involuntariness is supported by findings
of being in custody for Miranda purposes and that questioning by law enforce-
ment amounted to an interrogation. 15 1 Conversely, a conclusion of voluntariness
is usually supported by a finding that a suspect was not in custody and was not
interrogated. 1 5 2
The State also contended that Sawyer failed to allege that his statements were
involuntary. 15 3 The State suggested that State v. Caouette1 54 provided the test to
properly determine voluntariness and that it should be used as a basis for establish-
ing the proper standard of review: "'to find a statement voluntary, it must first be
established that it is the result of the defendant's exercise of his own free will and
rational intellect.... [The trial court's decision] will not be disturbed on appeal if
there is evidence providing rational support for its conclusion.' 155 Relying on
Caouette, the State argued that the trial judge "misapprehended" the substantive
law by producing a legally incorrect result. 156 The State argued that the Law
Court must determine whether the trial court's findings were rationally supported. 1
57
Lastly, the State contended that the judge's application of law and findings of fact
did not rationally support the conclusion that Sawyer's admission was involun-
tary.158
Sawyer primarily argued, on appeal, that the State did not prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that his admission to driving the truck was a voluntary state-
ment. 159 Sawyer asserted that the State carried the whole burden to prove that his
admission was voluntary.16 0 Sawyer also claimed that he did not have the option
148. id. 4, 772 A.2d 1173. The trial court concluded the following: (1) the officer's inves-
tigatory stop was justified, (2) Sawyer was not in custody, but the officer did interrogate him, (3)
the officer did not have to give Miranda warnings, (4) Sawyer's statement that he was driving
the truck was made involuntarily, and (5) Sawyer's statement about drinking too much was
made voluntarily. Id.
149. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 14, State v. Sawyer, 2001 ME 88, 772 A.2d 1173 (No.
KEN-00-466).
150. Id. at 9.
151. See, e.g., State v. Mikulewicz, 462 A.2d 497,500 (Me. 1983).
152. See, e.g., State v. Theriault, 425 A.2d 986, 990 (Me. 1981).
153. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 1, State v. Sawyer, 2001 ME 88, 772 A.2d 1173 (No.
KEN-00-466). The State argued Defendant presented no evidence that the statements were in-
voluntary, id. at 6, and that "the Court had no evidence concerning [his] subjective state of
mind." Id. at 11.
154. 446 A.2d 1120 (Me. 1982).
155. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 11, State v. Sawyer, 2001 ME 88,772 A.2d 1173 (No.KEN
-00-466) (quoting State v. Caouette, 446 A.2d 1120, 1123-24 (Me. 1982)). Interestingly, the
State subtly rephrased the term "not voluntary" from the suppression order to "involuntary"
when it suggested the standard of review. Id. at 13. The Law Court did not discuss this change
of terminology.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 18.
159. Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 6, State v. Sawyer, 2001 ME 88, 772 A.2d 1173 (No.
KEN-00-466).
160. Id.
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to not answer the officer's questions and that the State did not provide any evi-
dence to show that his statement was voluntary. 16 1
Sawyer sought to refute the State's assertion that the trial court came to two
legally inconsistent conclusions by claiming that the trial judge "had no choice but
to rule" that the State failed to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt. 162
Moreover, Sawyer countered the State's argument that the judge's findings inad-
equately supported her "not voluntary" conclusion by arguing that the State pre-
sented nothing regarding Sawyer's mental or physical capacity in order to assess
the totality of the circumstances. 16 3 Finally, in arguing that the trial court should
be affirmed, Sawyer added that he "ha[d] no burden of his own." 164
The Law Court vacated the order suppressing Sawyer's admission to driving
in favor of the State. 165 Citing State v. Coombs166 and State v. Rees, 167 the court
embraced the requirements that the prosecution must prove voluntariness beyond
a reasonable doubt, and that voluntariness must result from the "'defendant's free
will and rational intellect.' 1 6 8 The court also noted the three "fairness" policy
objectives that are effected by fulfilling the requirements to find voluntariness
outlined in State v. Mikulewicz. 169 The court reasoned that a "totality of the cir-
cumstances analysis" should be applied to the factual findings of the trial court in
order to determine whether Sawyer's admission was not part "'of his own free will
and rational intellect.' 1 70 The court held that the suppression order should be
vacated because the trial court had "placed great importance on the irrelevant sub-
jective belief of the police officer, as to whether Sawyer was free to walk away."1 7 1
161. Id. at 4, 6.
162. Id. at 8.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 11.
165. State v. Sawyer, 2001 ME 88, 11, 772 A.2d 1173.
166. 1998 ME 1, 704 A.2d 387.
167. 2000 ME 55, 748 A.2d 976.
168. State v. Sawyer, 2001 ME 88,1 8, 772 A.2d 1173 (quoting State v. Rees, 2000 ME 55,1
3, 748 A.2d 978). The Coombs and Rees cases are recent embodiments of the Caouette test. See
supra text accompanying notes 154-55.
169. State v. Sawyer, 2001 ME 88, 8,772 A.2d 1173 (citing State v. Mikulewicz, 462 A.2d
497 (Me. 1983) (holding that the voluntariness requirement "(1)... discourages objectionable
police practices; (2) ... protects the mental freedom of the individual; and (3) ... preserves a
quality of fundamental fairness in the criminal justice system.").
170. Id. (quoting State v. Rees, 2000 ME 55, 3,748 A.2d 976). In an apparent instructional
narrative for remand, the court compared the facts and holdings of recent confession cases. Id.
9-10, 772 A.2d 1173. The "involuntary" cases cited in Sawyer, id. 9, 772 A.2d 1173, in-
cluded: State v. Rees, 2000 ME 55, 11 1-2, 748 A.2d 976 (defendant's statements found invol-
untary as a result of his suffering from dementia); State v. Mikulewicz, 462 A.2d at 498-99, 501
(Me. 1983) (defendant's statements found involuntary because he was elderly, naked, and sick,
while interrogation was long, continuous, and conducted by many officers who allowed him to
drink in hopes that he would talk); and State v. Caouette, 446 A.2d 1120, 1121, 1124 (Me. 1982)
(defendant's statements found involuntary because he was "incarcerated,... vomiting, crying,
frightened, emotionally upset, and.., had no conscious intent to discuss the case.").
The "voluntary" cases cited in Sawyer, 2002 ME 88, 110, 772 A.2d 1173, included: State v.
Coombs, 1998 ME 1, 1 5-6, 11-12, 704 A.2d 387 (defendant's statements found voluntary
beyond a reasonable doubt, despite formal detention setting, because testimony showed that
defendant was not threatened or promised leniency in exchange for confession); and State v.
Theriault, 425 A.2d 986, 990 (Me. 1981) (defendant's statements found voluntary beyond a
reasonable doubt despite officer's non-coercive, yet coaxing remarks: "it would be better to tell
us [the truth]" and "people would think more of [you] if [you] got it off [your] chest.").
171. State v. Sawyer, 2001 ME 88, $ 11,772 A.2d 1173.
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In a footnote, the court embraced a legal requirement that Sawyer needed to
rebut the prosecution's initial showing of voluntariness to indicate that his state-
ment was involuntary, and as such, that Sawyer failed to meet that burden. 172 The
court constructed its holding from two cases that allocated the burden of produc-
tion to the defendant after a prima facie showing of voluntariness by the prosecu-
tion, citing an Illinois intermediate appellate court decision 173 and a Maine case 174
for persuasive authority. 17 5
C. The Dissent
The dissent rejected the notion that the accused should ever have to present
evidence pertaining to the voluntariness of a statement by emphasizing the consti-
tutional protections that prevent a court from compelling a criminal defendant to
testify against oneself.176 They noted that a criminal defendant may be required to
raise an issue of voluntariness, which is accomplished by the minimal act of filing
a proper motion to suppress.177 Under this rationale, the dissent contended that
Sawyer satisfactorily generated the issue of voluntariness. 17 8 The dissent's rea-
soning appears to give substantive meaning to how little the defendant should pro-
duce to meet the burden of going forward (or burden of production to avoid a
directed verdict) after a prima facie showing by prosecution of voluntariness.
The dissenting opinion advanced pre-Caouette voluntariness rules: (1) that a
defendant may rely solely on the facts presented by the proponent of the issue, (2)
that reasonable inferences may be drawn from those facts, and (3) that the court
has discretion to disbelieve the proponent's witness, even if the testimony is undis-
puted. 179 Further, they maintained that Sawyer's arguments were consistent with
these rules and that he was merely successful in urging the judge to conclude that
the State's proof was insufficient. 180 The dissent also insisted that a finding of
voluntariness cannot be compelled if the trial judge used his or her discretion to
disbelieve parts of the State's only witness and that the trial court should be re-
versed only if the evidence compelled a finding of voluntariness. 18 1 The dissent
asserted that the evidence did not show that the defendant was free from the officer's
compulsion. 182 Lastly, the dissent implied that the majority mischaracterized the
172. See id. n.5, 772 A.2d at 1777 n.5.
173. People v. Cozzi, 416 N.E.2d 1192,1195 (I11. App. Ct. 1981). This case holds, inter alia:
"Where the State makes prima facie showing that a confession was voluntary, the burden of
producing evidence to show that confession was involuntary shifts to the defense, and shifts
back to the State only when defendant has produced such evidence." Id.
174. State v. Eaton, 577 A.2d 1162, 1167 (Me. 1990). The Sawyer court interpreted the
Eaton decision as "finding a statement to be voluntary when the officer testified to the non-
coercive nature of the incident and the defendant did not produce contrary evidence." State v.
Sawyer, 2001 ME 88, n.5, 772 A.2d 1173.
175. State v. Sawyer, 2001 ME 88, n.5,772 A.2d 1173.
176. See id. 1 12, 772 A.2d 1173 (Alexander, J., dissenting) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V;
and ME. CONST. art. I, § 6).
177. Id. (citing M.R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(3) & 41A(a)).
178. Id.
179. Id. 15, 772 A.2d 1173.
180. Id.
181. Id. 16, 772 A.2d 1173 (citing State v. Caouette, 446A.2d 1120, 1123-24 (Me. 1982)).
182. Id. 18,772 A.2d 1173 (citing State v. Caouette, 446 A.2d at 1123-24) (quoting Culombe
v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961)).
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trial judge's findings as issues of law instead of issues of fact in order to broaden
the scope of review and eventually overturn the trial court. 183
The dissent agreed with the majority in one.aspect of the case-the arrest-
agreeing that it should not have been suppressed because, as a matter of law, the
officer had probable cause to believe that Sawyer violated the law by operating the
vehicle. 184 The dissent recognized that probable cause to arrest "may be based on
a wide variety of information, some of which may be inadmissible at trial." 185
IV. DISCUSSION
The full practical impact of the Sawyer decision will probably be determined
in Maine's next several confession cases. As they unfold, one should logically
ask: How thoroughly did the majority sketch out any changes to the substantive
law and how fair is the policy of allocating some of the burden of production to a
defendant, as Illinois does 186 in admitting evidence of a confession? Illinois and
Maine are not alone in this explicit burden allocation rule. Indiana, Mississippi
and Missouri also make clear that a defendant has an obligation to produce evi-
dence in order to avoid an unfavorable ruling after the prosecution makes a prima
facie showing of voluntariness. 187 Remember, however, that the burden of per-
suasion ultimately remains with the prosecution to convince the trier of fact be-
yond a reasonable doubt of all necessary elements.
At least two factors should be considered when comparing a burden-alloca-
tion policy with other alternatives: (1) whether statutory law complements a
jurisdiction's case law rule of obligating the defendant to rebut the presumption of
voluntariness; and (2) whether voluntariness only needs to be proven by a prepon-
derance or by the higher beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of the evidence.
Rebuttable presumptions in the criminal law are commonly open to constitu-
tional challenge on due process grounds. 18 8 The most common rebuttable pre-
sumption rule in confession cases operates in such a way that once the prosecution
has proved facts for a prima facie case, the presumption of voluntariness is permis-
sive for the jury rather than mandatory, even if the defendant offers no evidence to
rebut the prima facie case. 189 Take, for an analogous example, a situation in which
an officer stops an automobile, wishes to conduct a search for illicit drugs, and
later asserts that the driver-defendant was warned of the right to refuse consent.
183. Id. $$ 19-20, 772 A.2d 1173.
184. Id. $ 22, 772 A.2d 1173.
185. Id.
186. The burden shifting rule in Cozzi, 416 N.E.2d 1192, 1195 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981), appears to
remain as good law and has been cited in many Illinois decisions. For a brief overview of
confession law in Illinois, see Stephanie Rae Williams, The Untimely Demise of the Involuntary
Confession Material Witness Rule in Illinois, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 105, 108-10 (1993). Will-
iams explains that Illinois statute requires the prosecution to prove voluntariness by a prepon-
derance of the evidence and to carry the initial burden of proof at a suppression hearing, but that
the defense then "has an 'evidentiary obligation to rebut' the prima facie case." Id. at 110
(quoting People v. Reid, 554 N.E.2d 174, 186 (I11. 1990)). The Illinois statute is 725 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. § 5/114-11(d) (West 1992).
187. See supra note 95 (listing states with burden shifting to the defendant).
188. See generally 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTr, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW,
CRIMINAL PRACTICE SERIES, § 2.13, at 223 (1986).
189. Id. § 1.8, at 79-80.
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While the Government would desire to show that the suspect had knowledge of
this right, such knowledge is only a factor, but not required to establish a voluntary
consent. 19 0 However, the defendant needs to make some sort of showing that he
or she did not know of the right to refuse consent: this can be done by simply
failing to testify to that knowledge or refusing to admit, if asked, that the warnings
were given. 19 1
In developing these principles, the Supreme Court has largely borrowed from
confession law to articulate a standard of voluntariness for consent searches. In
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,192 the Court stated that there was "no talismanic defi-
nition of 'voluntariness,' mechanically applicable to the host of situations where
the question had arisen."' 193 In deciding that voluntariness1 94 of a consent to a
search is a question of fact to be determined by a totality of all the circumstances
test, the Court noted that the competing needs for legitimate searches and assur-
ances of coercion-free police activity must be accommodated. 19 5
The inquiry into the allocation of burdens of production, then, is a difficult
one. The nature of a defendant's subjective understanding is what the trier of fact
must determine. Should it be enough that defendants can adequately meet that
burden by testifying that they did not know they could leave the situation, which
would be only slightly more than the defendant offered in the Sawyer case? Or
should a defendant be required to produce more evidence and perhaps elicit more
testimony that could push the boundaries to just short of violating one's privilege
against self-incrimination? Some scholars criticize the notion that government
must carry the entire burden of proof and advocate for "eliciting admissible fruit"
from defendants before trial by actually restricting their Fifth Amendment privi-
leges. 19 6 On the other hand, the Michigan Supreme Court has stated: "There can
be no such thing as confession of guilt by silence in or out of court. The unan-
swered allegation by another of the guilt of a defendant is no confession of guilt on
the part of a defendant." 197 Consequently, the Sawyer decision was less than clear
regarding what level of additional evidence would be good enough to rebut the
prosecution's showing.
Commentators agree that a court may adopt rebuttable presumptions and thus
allocate burdens of proof in order to meet its obligation to achieve accurate fact
finding during its admissibility inquiries. 198 Perhaps if a court can legitimately
decide that evidence is insufficient to overcome a prima facie showing of a rebut-
table presumption, 19 9 then extending such a pro-prosecution approach to cases
beyond the area of voluntariness should be proper. The inquiry necessarily leads
190. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973).
191. See Wesley MacNeil Oliver, With an Evil Eye and an Unequal Hand: Pretextual Stops
and Doctrinal Remedies to Racial Profiling, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1409, 1470 (2000).
192. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
193. Id. at 224.
194. The Court held, inter alia, that "there is no reason for us to depart in the area of consent
searches, from the traditional definition of 'voluntariness."' Id. at 229.
195. Id. at 227.
196. Akhil Reed Amar & Ren6e B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: the Self-In-
crimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 893-95 (1995).
197. People v. Bigge, 285 N.W. 5, 6 (Mich. 1939).
198. Yale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress "Overrule" Miranda?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 883, 945
(2000).
199. Strauss, supra note 25, at 194.
MAINE LAW REVIEW
to questions of what alternative presumptions exist, which ones are "better," and
for whom. 200 Professor Stephen J. Schulhofer contends that, "[a] conclusive pre-
sumption of compulsion [or involuntariness] is in fact a responsible reaction to the
problems of the voluntariness test, to the rarity of cases in which compelling pres-
sures are truly absent, and to the adjudicatory costs of case-by-case decisions in
this area." 20 1 At least Alabama, Arizona and Oregon follow this model of initially
presuming involuntariness of confessions, thus allocating the burden to the pros-
ecution.202 This discussion of presumptions, of course, is overshadowed by the
irrebuttable presumption that statements are "compelled" for Fifth Amendment
purposes if statements are obtained in contravention to Miranda's admissibility
requirements 203
Perhaps the Maine-style burden of proving voluntariness beyond a reasonable
doubt at a pre-trial suppression hearing suggests that juries must consider evi-
dence of a confession, if admitted, as super-reliable, whereas in Illinois, jury con-
sideration of confession evidence is permissive instead of mandatory.20 4 If this is
true about Maine's law, the Law Court should clarify whether Sawyer has changed
the substantive law, and if so, how the law relates to the constitutional prohibition
of relieving the prosecution of the duty to prove every element of a crime beyond
a reasonable doubt20 5 as required by In re Winship.206
If the prosecutor's burden of production is very high, as we are accustomed to
thinking that it is for a jury to rationally find that all elements are proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, that standard should adequately protect innocent defendants,
and reduce the need for right-to-silence protection. 207 Conversely, if the burden
of production is functionally lowered, then guilty suspects would probably not
remain silent if confronted with the existence of unfavorable witness reports that
the prosecution might offer in evidence, and the lack of protection associated with
such incriminating evidence. 208 In other words, the lower the burden of produc-
tion is for the prosecutor, the stronger the incriminating evidence necessarily be-
comes; and the higher the standard is, incriminating evidence becomes function-
ally weaker.
The facts of the Sawyer decision did not present strong evidence of involun-
tariness. There was only the arrest and two incriminating statements, if allowed in
evidence, by which the jury could possibly find Sawyer guilty.2 09 If the Law
200. See supra note 95 (listing states with various forms of voluntariness presumptions).
201. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. Cm. L. REV. 435, 453 (1987).
Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law, and Director of the Center for Studies in
Criminal Justice, University of Chicago Law School. Id. at 435.
202. See supra note 95 (listing states with various forms of involuntariness presumptions).
203. Strauss, supra note 25, at 191-92. In his article, Strauss rejects Professor Grano's harsh
criticism of the Miranda decision as an illegitimate use of the Supreme Court's power, and that
the Court should rather adopt a "rebuttable presumption" with regard to statements obtained in
violation of Miranda's police interrogation requirements. Id.
204. See People v. Patterson, 610 N.E.2d 16, 25 (Ill. 1992) ("The voluntariness of a confes-
sion, under ordinary circumstances, only needs to be established by a preponderance of the
evidence." (internal quotation and citation omitted)).
205. See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 313-15 (1985) (recognizing that states are prohib-
ited from using evidentiary presumptions that essentially relieve the State of proving elements
of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt).
206. 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
207. Seidmann & Stein, supra note 120, at 470.
208. Id.
209. State v. Sawyer, 2001 ME 88, 3, 772 A.2d 1173.
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Court has indicated that it is willing to classify similar issues as questions of law in
the future, this may result in a functional definition of voluntariness that will fre-
quently assign to the defendant the burden of production to rebut the prosecution's
initial showing of voluntariness. This would probably result in an increased rate
of convictions.
On the other hand, the Law Court may embrace the view that the burden allo-
cation has not functionally changed, and that absent an unsupported finding of the
trial court, questions of determining the factors of voluntariness shall remain ques-
tions of fact that shall not be disturbed on appeal. This approach would probably
not affect the rate of convictions based on questions of voluntariness, but would
certainly allow defendants the opportunity to at least make a showing to generate
an issue for an admissibility ruling, with assurances that the inquiry would not be
a never-ending search for incriminating statements of the defendant to be used as
substantive evidence for the jury. This approach would be preferred, in order to
promote fairness to the accused.
In crafting a functional definition of the substantive law, the state's policies
that reflect "institutional realities" 2 10 should be articulated in order to provide trial
court guidance for its proper administration. First, a defendant has the burden of
pleading specific ground(s) of involuntariness in a motion to suppress a confes-
sion. Sometimes the prosecution only has limited evidence, which may make a
prima facie showing of a voluntary confession possible, but difficult. In such a
situation, the defendant should still have to show a reason why the prosecution's
evidence is either not sufficient or why the evidence should be discredited. The
prosecution should not be required to negate specific claims if the defendant does
not sufficiently raise them. 2 11
The point here is that how the substantive law of confessions is functionally
defined will determine whether the jury is allowed to hear a confession. Prosecu-
tors have an interest in ensuring that a defendant meets his or her burden of plead-
ing involuntariness: they may want to put in evidence only enough to prevail on a
suppression motion and strategically save other evidence until later in a trial. Per-
haps defendants should benefit from such a strategic consideration if they can meet
their burden-thus allocating a higher functional burden of production on the pros-
ecution, but be denied the benefit of "previewing" the state's evidence if they have
insufficient ground(s) to suppress an alleged confession.
This model would reflect an expectation that defense counsel should be pre-
pared at a suppression hearing if it expects to keep an alleged confession from the
ears of a jury. If the confession is admitted, defense counsel still would have a
right to present a complete defense to a jury, including evidence of the environ-
ment surrounding the alleged confession that would discredit its reliability.2 12
210. See Strauss, supra note 25, at 208 (arguing that under any plausible constitutional inter-
pretation, state courts are implicitly required to take "institutional realities" into account-and
should be encouraged to do so-when constructing doctrines that govern future admissibility
cases).
211. See Commonwealth v. Mahnke, 335 N.E.2d 660, 679 (Mass. 1975) ("'Every criminal
defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do so. But that privilege
cannot be construed to include the right to commit perjury.... The shield provided by Miranda
cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of'a defense, free from the risk of
confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances."') (quoting Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222,
225-26 (1971)), overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Dyke, 474 N.E.2d 172 (Mass.
1985).
212. Smith v. State, 439 S.E.2d 483, 485-86 (Ga. 1994).
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A second institutional reality is that a trial judge should be able to uniformly
administer the substantive law. Describing that it would be the state's preliminary
burden to establish a confession's voluntariness for admissibility, the Law Court
might choose to ask defendants who deny voluntariness to then "go forward with
evidence to support his position,"2 13 in those cases in which a defendant has supe-
rior access to the evidence of involuntariness. 2 14 In order to ensure fairness to the
defendant, it may be helpful for the trial judge to distinguish between suppression
motions that are based on internal coercive factors, such as in State v. Rees where
the defendant suffered from dementia,2 15 and those motions based on external
coercive factors, such as in State v. Mikulewicz where several police officers al-
lowed the defendant to consume excessive amounts of alcohol in hopes of foster-
ing inculpatory statements. 2 16
With regard to motions that are based on internal coercive factors, defense
counsel should be allocated a functional burden of production because they are the
party with superior knowledge of evidence of those factors. 2 17 If defense counsel
fails to meet that burden, the motion should probably be denied. If defense coun-
sel meets this burden, the prosecution must then meet its burden of persuasion,
which it always has. The motion could be granted if the prosecution fails to prove
voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt. This suggestion would also require that
from the pleadings, a trial judge determine whether the suppression motion is based
on internal or external coercive factors. Finally, a suppression motion would also
need to assert that offensive law enforcement conduct was present, in order to
meet the United States Supreme Court standard of prerequisite police coercive
activity in Colorado v. Connelly in order to find a confession involuntary.2 18
With regard to motions that are based on external coercive factors, the pros-
ecution should be allocated a higher functional burden of production than with an
internal coercion-based motion to suppress, because they are the party with supe-
rior knowledge of evidence of how law enforcement personnel conducted them-
selves. 2 19 If, for example, defense counsel meets his or her burden of pleading on
a motion to suppress, the state must meet its burden of production and persuasion,
which it always has, to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt.
In other words, the issue of which party should bear the burden of production
is probably not answerable with a one-size-fits-all rule, irrespective of the nature
of the involuntariness asserted. A list of persuasive, but not conclusive factors to
consider that would successfully allocate a higher functional burden of production
from defense counsel to the state might include: evidence of impermissible police
213. Reddish v. State, 167 So. 2d 858, 864 (Fla. Oct. 7, 1964), modifying 167 So. 2d 858 (Fla.
July 22, 1964).
214. See generally, 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 11, § 337, at 413 ("A doctrine often repeated by
the courts is that where the facts with regard to an issue lie peculiarly in the knowledge of a
party, that party has the burden of proving the issue."); FLEMMING JAMES JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCE-
DURE § 7.16 (5th ed. 2001) ("The burden of proof traditionally is placed on the party having the
readier access to knowledge about the fact in question.").
215. State v. Rees, 2000 ME 55, 2, 748 A.2d 976.
216. State v. Mikulewicz, 462 A.2d 497, 498-99 (Me. 1983).
217. See sources cited supra note 214.
218. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164 (1986). See also supra text accompanying
notes 31-51. But see State v. Rees, 2000 ME 55, 7-9, 748 A.2d 976.
219. See sources cited, supra note 214.
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conduct, actual or threatened violence, offers of reward, or coercive pressures that
were not dispelled. 2 20 Without a sufficient basis of involuntariness from defense
counsel (which need not be testimony from the accused) the State should not need
to produce additional evidence for the trial judge to rule. 221 The trial judge then
would consider all of the witnesses' evidence to the alleged confession using a
totality of the circumstances-consideration test to determine whether it was volun-
tary.22 2 This approach incorporates constitutional requirements and would allow
the Law Court future opportunities to expand or refine the lists of internal and
external factors as the case law develops. Prosecutors and defense attorneys would
also have a better picture of the substantive law from this approach, and trial judges
would retain flexibility in making voluntariness determinations.
V. CONCLUSION
The Law Court should clarify the confession law, and how it would fit into the
relevant constitutional provisions as well as taking institutional realities into ac-
count. 223 At the very least, the court would be helpful to clarify the status of
Maine's rebuttable presumption with respect to the fact that since 1972, only judges
make admissibility rulings.224 The responsibility of a jury is much narrower than
that in the pre-Miranda era on the admissibility of confessions because they are no
longer assigned the role of trier of fact on questions of voluntariness. 225 Further,
clarifying the constitutional implications (or lack thereof) would help functionally
define voluntariness and enhance the predictability of trial court rulings on the
matter. In other words, the court can and should keep trying to make the process
work "better."
Unlike the suppression judge's reasoning in Sawyer, custody and interroga-
tion findings are usually elements that together make up the basis of a finding of
involuntariness. 2 26 Despite the Law Court's criticism of how the judge supported
her conclusion, an issue that the Sawyer decision has created is whether Maine's
law of confessions has in any way reallocated or raised the bar for a criminal de-
fendant, and if so - how high is it? Regardless of whether such a new rule has
been created, the Law Court has an opportunity to delve into the policy rationales
that support the extension of burden allocation at a suppression hearing as well as
those that warn against it. Undoubtedly, revisiting this area would clarify for pros-
ecutors and criminal defense attorneys what expectations and requirements will
permit admissible confessions in the State of Maine.
Michael Theodore Bigos
220. Spann v. State, 771 So. 2d 883, 900 (Miss. 2000); State v. Amaya-Ruiz, 800 P.2d 1260,
1272 (Ariz. 1990).
221. See State v. Trostle, 951 P.2d 869, 879 (Ariz. 1997) (denying defense motion without
further state evidence).
222. Id.
223. See Strauss, supra note 25, at 208.
224. Compare State v. Collins, 297 A.2d 620, 636 (Me. 1972), with State v. Merrow, 161 Me.
111, 116-17, 208 A.2d 659,662 (1965) (It is not clear if Maine case law still requires a defendant
to "rebut [a] presumption [of voluntariness] by evidence" (quoting State v. Grover, 96 Me. 363,
368, 52A. 757, 759 (1902)).
225. State v. Collins, 297 A.2d at 636.
226. E.g., State v. Michaud, 1998 ME 251, 3-4, 724 A.2d 1222.
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